The historical background
In the early 1960s the Australian colonial Administtation of the Territory of Papua and New · Guinea (TPNG), as it was then, legislated for the introduction of a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration. It did so agains· t a background of 60 years of paternalistic over-regulation of labour, in which only the Rabaul Strike of 1929 stands out as a direct challenge to employer and state authority (Gammage, 1975; Willis, 1970) . Individual protes't against conditions of work h~ however, not been uncommon and the Administtation's paternalistic approach had inhibited the growth of a free labour market. The result was "a perpetual condition of labour crisis" (Rowley, 1958, p.524) , in which Administration policy concentrated on the highly regulated plantation sector. Even in this area there was too little labour available and in the growing urban labour markets workers lac~ed the skills and commitment to successfully partner foreign capital in the tasks of economic development (Hess, 1983) .
Eventually it was the collective action of Port Moresby's workers which precipitated a reappraisal of government policy (Hess, 1982, p.50ft) . Motivated by considerations of international and Australian domestic politics, the Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck, chose to ignore the advice of his own colonial bureaucracy as well as white settler opinion and legislated for a modem system of industrial regulation which included legalisation of unions. The two pieces of legislation prepared for this purpose were the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the Industrial Organisations Ordinance. Hasluck claimed that the legislation would allow Papua New Guineans to develop their own system of industrial negotiation. He would "clear a path but let them walk it" (Departnaent of Territories, 1961, p.6) . In fact these ordinances have detenuined much of the subsequent shape of PNG industrial relations. They reversed the previous policy of suppressing dissatisfaction in favour of channelling it into acceptable paths. The fotmer ordinance made provision for Industry Councils, Boards of Inquiry and direct negotiation as · well as compulsory conciliation and arbitration. The latter • Michael Hess teaches in the School of Industrial Relations and Organization Behaviour at the University of New South Wales. James Gissua is a Doctoral student in that School and was formerly Dir· ector of PNG's National Tripartite Consultative Council.
• 40 Michael Hess and James Gissua legalised unions and offered them a dubious degree of protection from civil suit (Seddon, 1968) . The cost to unions was a series of controls over their structure and operation. The most serious of these were the powers to register and de-register vestẽd in the newly created office of the Industrial Registrar.
The legislation was undoubtedly progressive in that it finally overcame the out-dated situation in which "the very idea of collective bargaining was almost a subversive one" (Rowley, 1968, p.7) . Giving workers with little knowledge of industrial organisation the right to freedom of association was, howev. er, a negligible concession. With little possibility of unionism developing in rural areas the new legislation would con~ol plantation workers as completely as the old had. By providing acceptable channels for their grievances. , it would deal much better with the dissatisfaction of urban workers. Furthetn1ore, the old fotrns of control, developed over the years of colonial rule, were no longer politically acceptable internationally and their value within PNG was . also being called in doubt by increasingly vocal nationalist sentiment.
The newly legislated industrial relations system was tripartite in nature. Employers with five long established organisations welie well prepared for collective negotiations. The Administration had recently elevated its labour office to depat uoental status and was also well able to represent its viewpoint. There were, however, no unions capable of representing PNG workers in negotiations. It fell to the officers of the new Department of Labour and subsequently the Bureau of Industrial Organisations, which was created especially for the purpose, to 'encourage' the fot rnation of unions to fulftl the tripartite requirements of the industrial ~elations machinery. On paper they did this very successfully. serious doubts about whether they had the ability to be really effective in pursuing their members' industrial interests. Three factors with potential impact on organisational effectiveness are immediately evident. The frrst is the extremely small size of the unions. Of the 47 registered in 1975 only eight had more than 500 members. The effect of this on the ability of unions ro be genuine parties to collective negotiation may be judged by the contemporary estimate that 300 was the absolute minimum membership for fmancial viability (Martin, 1969) . The second factor is the general and regional character of union coverage. Half of the registered unions were regionally based general workers' associations. Their notional coverage extended to all wor~ers in their 42 Michae. l Hess and James Gissua rẽgion, who were not petrnanent public servants. In practice these organisations had little chance of developing more than a token presence in the many small and scattered workplaces which such a coverage implied. They tended to be concentratẽd in one or two workplaces of the major employers of casual labour such as the wharves or Public Works Offices of their ~egional centres. ' The third factor of note, revealed in the comparison of average membership with that of 1974, is that membership was subject to wild fluctuations. Whether this was due to workers' lack of understanding of the "proper" role of unions (Patterson, 1969, p.26) , their "unfamiliarity with an association which requires periodic renewal of membership by cash subscription" (Deech, 1976, p.15) , or the new organisations' failure to hold on to '"frrst fervour' recruits" (Plowman, 1978, p.6 ) such marked instability would clearly have had an adverse ẽffect on the unions' organisational capacity.
Only three of the regional workers' associations have atuacted detailed study (Metcalfe, 1968; Stevenson, 1986; Hess, 1982) . A common picture emerges from these studies of capable, ambitious leaders establishing unions with enthusiastic workẽr suppon but moving quickly on to the national political stage. Deprived of constant contact with these leaders the associations were unable to represent their members in mundane matters. Nor were they ablẽ to meet their obligations under the Industrial Organisations ilidinance. Their membership lists were rarely accurate and they often failed to carry out the relatively simple clerical tasks of conducting annual elections and audits. They were not, however, de-registered, but were propped up by the Deparnnent of Labour to fulfil, on paper at least, the tripartite requirements of the industrial relations system. Commentators have pointed out that this poor level of union development undertnined the machinery's potential for dispute resolution and wage fixing (Isaac, 1968) and have variously blamed the colonial background (Rowley, 1968) , workers' lack of education (Bailey, 1970) , their "misconceptions" about how unions should operate (Patterson, 1969) and poor leadership (Chapman, 1969) . Less attention has been paid to the handful of exceptional organisations which were able to develop both the membership and leadership prerequisites for effective operntion within the system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration ( (Spaull, 1974; Hess, 1986) .
At independence PNG's industrial relations system was a decade old. It operated at several levels and its degree of success varied from level to level. In the workplace it was, with a few notable excẽptions, irrelevant In the public sector only the Public Service Association and the Teachers' Association were organisationally competent. In private industry only the Bougainville unions and the Central District Waterside Workẽrs' Union were able to represent their members in the workplace. A larger number of unions were able to participate in the system at the level of award making through the intervention of absentee leaders. Their industrial action · was generally limited to the agreements such leaders made with employers which ensured their members received flow-ons from major awards and periodic minimum wagẽ increases. Few unions were well enough organised to negotiate over a wider range of issues or to deploy the weapons of industrial action in support of their demands. Only at the most general level of wage fixing, where direct union input was limited to the appearance of a few advocates, was the system really successful. In 1972 amendments to the Industrial Relations Ordinance strengthened the role of such 'outside' union leaders by making Minimum Wages Boards the centre piece of the wage fixing system. The minimum urban and rural rates fixed by this tribunal were to have a seminal effect through flow-ons. Unions which chose to participate in the hearings could do so by engaging a competent advocate while those that did not could merely apply to have their awards altered to confotnl with the new national minimums.
In summary then, the industrial relations system inherited by PNG at independence was at its most successful at a bureauc1 atic level. As a mechanism for articulating and resolving industrial grievances in the workplace it was frustrated by a lack of adequate union organisation.
Trends in Papua New Guinea unionism
An instructive example of how union weakness continued to inhibit the development of effective industrial relations mechanisms is revealed in the history of PNG's peak union council. This began in the mid-1960s as the Federation of Workers' Associations (FWA) (Hess, 1988) . It was set up by a coalition of interests comprising the colonial officers charged with overseeing the operation of the industrial 11elations system and the emerging national Papua New , Guinean politicians, who were the leaders of the small regionally based general workers' associations. For the fotmer it represented an opportunity to enhance the operation of the system by creating a peak union body which would have the educated leadership and resourees they saw as a necessary prerequisite to the operation of the tripartite industrial relations machinery, . For the latter it was a chance to strut the developing national political stage.
Despite continued suppon from the Depatuuent of Labour and occasional interest from the Australian Council of Trade Unions the FW A achieved only an ephemeral exist· ence through the late 1960s. By the early 1970s it · was strong enough to act as a channel for wage claims but had no genuine capacity for action outside the industrial relations machinery (Langmo1e, 1973. p.l69) . For the politicians and Depaabuent of Labour officials who had supported its establishment this was not necessarily a bad outcome. The politicians had gained a national institution which they could be seen to lead and the industrial relations bureaucrats gained an organisation which enhanced the operation of the machinery they were called upon to administer. While neither would need to call upon it very often, the Federation provided for both groups a vehicle to transport industrial issues to the nationallẽvel at which they were most comfonable. The lack of genuine worker participation in the organisation also meant that it was unlikely to prove troublesona.e to either the politicians or the bureaucrats. It was, however, of very little real use to the worlcẽrs. Its utility for the industrial relations system was limited to preserving the fiction of tripartism, when in fact it did not genuinely represent ordinary workers at all.
In 1973 the organisation began to change as it came under the influence of younger PANGU Pany activists, who wen: at this rime radical nationalists. For the next decade PNG's peak union council was dominated by Tony lla. lla was the Member of Parliament for Lae and a PANGU stalwart. He began by changing the name of the FW A to the Trade Union Congress (PNGTUC) and moved its headquarters to Lae (Hess, 1992) . While lla did enhance the organisation's capacity for action, his principal motivation appears to have been political rather than industrial. Certainly the PNGTUC was much more active in his own electorate than anywhere else! As Ila moved, along with the PANGU Party, into government his politics became more conservativ· e. He rejected overtures from the left-wing World Federation of Trade Unions and led PNG unionism into a close international association with the rival, anti-communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. This anti-communist agenda was further strengthened by his desire to work closely with the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations international aid agency the America-Asia Free . Labor Institute. This organisation had a quite open agenda of supporting those unions in the Asia-Pacific region which would adopt a staunchly anti-communist position. Despite the paranoid statements of Australian 'intelligence' authorities there was no communist political influence in PNG. lla was nonetheless able to use the Americans as a source of finance. With their aid he built a PNGTUC office and workers' club complex and a medical centre in the suburbs of Lae. He also, perhaps because of the United States influence, sought to take the PNGTUC along the road of business unionism with proposals ranging from ownership of food processing companies to operating a travel agency and a five star hotel. None of these proposals came to anything but they used up a great deal of time and energy. They were allied with lla' s rise to national political prominence and after he became Minister for Labour in the late 1970s the confusion between union and business activity became even more pronounced. For long periods the PNGTUC's only activity was in this area of business schemes, while worker's wages and conditions were neglected. The best that can be said of lla's dual role as Minister for Labour and President of the PNGTUC is that his lack of differentiation, in undertaking the two apparently contradictory roles, made it possible for deparuuent officers to directly aid unions. The fact was, naturally enough, that this aid was directed towards enhancing the operation of the industrial relations system rather than pursuing the interests of the workers. It also reduced the unions to dependence on the government officials.
There is, however, little evidence that any large number of PNG unionists thought that this was in any way improper. Indeed there was considerable popular support for Ila 's leadership during this period in which he was seen by many workers as their best hope. By the , early 1980s the situation had changed. PANGU was out of government and Ila 's hold oyer the PNGTUC affiliates, which had been sustained by the distribution of government fmanced gifts, such as conference trips and study tours, lapsed. The more militant and effective Pon Moresby unions allied with the Bougainville Mine Workers' Union moved to have lla replaced and Henry Moses of the BMWU became PNGTUC president in 1983. In order to understand the significance of these events it is necessary to make a brief detour from the history of the peak council and look at some individual unions which were operating successfully.
The PNGTUC represented only private sector unions and its main strength came from the weak regionally based workers' associations. These were not, however, PNG's only private sector unions. Two organisations which had chosen a different path and had proven · more ẽffective w, ere the BMWU and the Central District Waterside Workers' Union (CDWWU). The fo11ner was based at Bougainville , Copper Limited's gigantic copper mine at Panguna. It cov, ered all wages employees and was led by the late Henry Moses, who was also a leader of the landowning clan at P, anguna. The BMWU may have been kick started in its attempts to organise the PNG workforce by the example of industrial negotiation set by militant Australian unionists during the mine's construction phase. By the mid 1970s it had developed into a fotnlidable union, which was very much a legitimate pan of both BCL's operation and life at Panguna and Arawa.
The CDWWU had follow, ed a more torturous path and this has been described at length elsewhere (Hess, l986) . Very briefly it grew out of the ruins of the Port Moresby Workers' Association which had promised much to urban workers but had collapsed in the late 1960s. The waterside workers decided that they would be better off in their own union. Their first lẽader was an aspiring local politician, Gavera Rea. When he w, ent into parliament in the 1972 elẽctions he introduced a young Australian, R, eg McAlister, to the waterside workers as a possible replacement. Earlier in the year, McAlister had created a public sensation when he crossed the lines of race to become an activist in the Clerical and Shop Assistant's Union.
McAlister was just the leader Port Moresby's waterside workers were looking for. His willingness to take militant action matched their mood He also brought to them an understanding of industrial tactics, which had previously been lacking. The CDWWU embarked on a campaign to refot m the casual system of employment. A major strike in 1972 caused the government to create a Boaro of Inquiry into the system of employment on Port Motesby's waterfront. Assisted by the advocacy of Notm Docker of the Australian Waterside Workers' Federation (WWF), the union used the inquiry as pan of a broad campaign. With funher industrial action and a well argued case it achieved a major victory. The casual system of employu aent was replaced by a register of watersiders, a roster to equalise work opportunities and the payment of attendance money for those nQt required for work on a particular day. The employers' rights to both hire and fire as they wished were severely restricted with major increases in wage rares and improvements in working conditions also being achieved.
No other PNG union had or has been able to achieve so much. Certainly the time was favourable to the union.. With the Whitlam government forcing the pace on the granting of independence and the upsurge of nationalist feeling of the period, tribunals of Papua Ne· w Guinean officials were ready to hear the case of a union of their fellow countrymen struggling against the outdated colonial management practices of foreign companies. But no other union was able to take anything like the advantage of this situation and much Ciiedit must go to McAlister and the CDWWU officials of this period and to the WWF, which provided strong logistical support through Notm Docker's advocacy.
ln In the public sector both the Public Employees Association (PEA) and the PNG Teachers' Association (PNGTA) inherited some useful situations from the unions of colonial officials they replaced. The early history of the PNGTA has been described by an Australian unionist, who was involved in assistance to the organisation in the early 1970s (Spaull, 1974) . It dev, eloped out of colonial structures, which represented Australian tẽachers in TPNG. As the teaching service became increasingly 'localised' Papua New Guinean teachers attempted to fotm their own organisations. The fus4 the Local Teachers Association, collapsed when its leader, Vincent Eri, was sent on a long overseas trip by the colonial Administration. The PNGTA was, however, able to overcome the problems of dependence upon a single individual and during the early 1970s, as PNG moved towards full independence it emerged as a well resourced and moderately successful union. ' The PEA evolved even more directly from its colonial predecessor. In the 1970s, when it was still dominated by Australian colonial officials, it had embarked upon demands for equal pay for PNG public servants doing the same jobs as their white colleagues. At the saute time it was heavily involved in negotiating retrenchment packages for the colonial officers themselves. Unfortunately for PN, G unionism the PEA and PNGTA continued to stand aloof from the PNGTUC. The BMWU and the WWSU, how, ever, became important factors in refouuing the moribund peak council. In 1985 this process received a huge boost with a major assistance package from the ICF'I'U-Asia Pacific Regional Office. . They agrẽed to fund a three year organisational program under which it was intended that the PNGTUC become a viable and independent organisation. The program included the secondment of a full-time officer for a year to 'monitor' progress and the establishment of a properly staffed office. Table 2 . Between 1985 and 1989 the PNGTUC went from representing 12 unions with a total membership of 17,500 to having 40 affiliates with a total claimed membership of 70,000. This gave the PNGTUC the right to claim to represent the interests of 33 per cent of the total workforce. At last PNG seemed to have a real union structure, which would bring · worker views into the economic decision making process in a genuine way. That this unity was fragile became apparent in the following year when frrst the PEA and then the PNGT A refused to pay affiliation fees on the ,ground that the PNGTUC was not doing enough for their members. In fact the motives were political. The large public sector unions had expected, · with some reason, that they would becorne the dominant forces in the . reformed PNGTUC. Tirimur had resisted this as an infringement of his own authority. The PEA. , in particular, had an equally deteuoined leader in Napoleon Liosi, who felt that he should have a greater role in PNGTUC affairs than Titimur was allowing.
In 1991 the argument was still going on with cooler heads on both sides trying to establish a fo1mula by which the large public sector unions could bring their rẽsources into the PNGTUC without completely dominating it.. The future success of the organisation depends heavily upon the outcome.
A final trend wonh noting in the recent development of PNG unions is the establishment of a Federation of Airline Workers' Unions. This was achieved in 1991 and was based on a working relationship which had been developed between the National Union of Airline Employees and other unions in the industry covering stewards, engineers and air traffic controllers. The pilots, union has remained outside the Federation but has cooperated with it in some areas.
Industrial disputation in the 1980s
In general the levels of industrial disputes in PN G have been low. The statistical picture for 1985 is fairly typical. Of 33 strikes reponed by the Department of Labour and Employtncnt, 22 occurred in primary production; 12 lasted less than one day and 18 less than two days; 20 were settled by voluntary conciliation through a third pany, usually an officer of the DepcunttGnt (Depmtuaent of Labour, 1986) . The majority of stti.kes, then, occurred on plantations where unions are either non-existent or poorly organised and were of shon duration. This points to their character as protest actions designed to attract the attention of someone who could address the workers' grievances. That such strikes were generally settled by conciliation by officers of the Dep8.1l•••ent of Labour adds to the view that their purpose was essentially to get the industrial relatio1 ' S machinery moving on an issue which workers had no other way of addressing.
There hav, e, howevẽr, been exceptions and it is the few longer disputes, which occurred as pan of an industrial campaign and went through the full gamut of industrial dispute mechanisms which tell us most about the operation of the system itself. Here we wish to present brief accounts of two such disputes, which reveal some fundamental issues in the effectiveness of PNG 's industrial relations processes.
The 1988 Ok Tedi dispute
The Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) operates a gold and copper mine at Mt. Fubilan in the Star Mountains of the Western Province in PNG. Since 1985 the mine has been managed by Australia's Broken Hill Proprietary Limited (BHP), which is the major partner in a consortium including German and US interests. This mine is located in one of the more underdeveloped and remotẽ pans of the country. The area was first contacted by government officials in 1963 and when mining occurred in 1982 no real 'development' had taken place. By 1988, however, the mining township of Tabubil had a population of 3,500, about 50 per cent of whom were mine employees and their dependents, with the other 50 per cent being made up of sub-contractors and government personneL Most PNG blue collar workers were members of the Ok Tedi Mining Construction and General Workers Union (GWU). In 1988, the GWU had about 1,400 members. An industrial a~ment, which had been re-negotiated over the yeus, provided the members with some of the most attractive conditions of employment in the country. There were several issues, however, which had remained unaddressed in this award and had the potential for causing major disputes.
The frrst was housing. Successive negotiations with the company over the years had not produced any significant results. The limited number of houses that were available had all been allocated to members of staff according to an allocation policy, which favoured the higher levels of management and therefore the foreign employees. For many union members the lack of housing had meant years of separation from their families. OTML refused to build more houses for three reasons. Firstly, world copper prices had declined to an extent where the repayment of its loans had become difficult to maintain while at the same time interests on its loans increased. Secondly, the banks would not approve any more loans in view of its tight financial situation. Thirdly, even if them were funds available, it might be difficult to build any more houses given the local geography.
Another issue of concern to the union related to training and localisation. All other private sector furns in PNG which employ foreign labour, are required every three years to provide progressive repons to the Depw unent of Labour and Employment and state when particular positions could be localised On numerous occasions, the union accused OTML of failing to fulfil its training and localisation plans thereby unduly limiting promotional opponunities for union members.
A final immedia~e issue in 1988 was the sudden introduction of a three shift system to increase prrxiuction. The union blamed the Executivẽ Manager (Mines), Rick Gazzard~ and the Employee Relations Manager, Bebea Konie for lack of consultation in the changes and demanded the termination of these two members of management. It was this tetnlination de. mand plus the long running issues of housing and localisation, which triggered one of the most difficult disputes PNG' s industrial relations system has had to face.
The strik!e commenced with 70 operators of heavy equipment at the mine pit walking out for three days on 18 July 1988. These workers were the most skilled of the PNG workforce and were employed alongside foreign workers brought into the country on account of their skills. They were also ẽxperienced miners with an understanding of industrial issues and action derived from work on mines such as Bougainville Copper Limited's Panguna operation. The operators struck without the company or the union executive knowing and described their action as a protest against the 'dictatorial' approach by Gazzard in attempting to control their work routines right down to the minute details. They also questioned management about the hasty manner by which major changes, such as the second shift, had been introduced . . . Demands for more housing as well as for better promotional opportunities were also raised. Since there had been neither the prescribed secret ballot nor any involvement of the union's elected officials the strike was considered illegal by the Department of Labour and Employment When the union executive agreed to take up the issues with the company the operators returned to work. The union-management negotiations between 22 July and 17 August failed to reach an agreement. Õn the one hand, the union insisted that a PNG national Kipling Uiari, Exẽcutive Manager (Public Affairs) lead the management team in plaoe of the expatriate Executive Manager (Personnel), · warren Pearson. On the other hand, the company adopted a non-negotiable stance on the tenoination issue claiming absolute n1anagement prerogative to "hlre and fire". Some progress was made on the issue of housing with the company agreeing to build 20 new houses but this fell well short of the union's demand for 500. The issue of localisation had been transfotmed into a question of reclassification but no progress was made on this. Both sides realised the inevitability of further industrial action. On 1 August Uiari asked the Depwuuent of Labour and Employment to intervene. While the union requested that the Industrial Registrar conduct a sec11et ballot on the question of further srrike action, the local MP, Bob Bubec, a fotmer OTML employee himself also got involved, meeting with the union executive on 2 August. The ballot overwhelmingly endorsed the proposed strike, which took place between 18 and 30 August. Union leaders, company security personnel and the 20 local police maintained order and the strike was peaceful. However, it achieved little for the union. The company's response to its demand on tettnination did not change while no progress was made on the housing and reclassification issues.
During the strike major weaknesses in the industrial relations machinery were evident. The major one was that the union , executive had no strategic plan. It seemed unaware of the implications of its actions, did not really want the strike and had no facilities for supponing members during a long dispute. The Depaxunent of Labour and Employment was equally unprepa!ied. A compulsory conference and the establishment of a board of inquiry had been considered but a number of problems prevented use of one of these options. Firstly, the tetmination demand was considered a non-industrial matter within the meaning of the Industrial Organisations Act and therefore, could not be dealt with using the formal industrial relations machinery. The demand had been also considered as interfering with one of the fundamental rights of management prerogatives. Secondly, both panies appeared not to favour arbitration as a suitable option. Despite the fact that hafdly any consistent approach had been adopted by way of negotiations between the panies, both expressed optimism about a settlement through negotiations. lbi!idly, the company had been reluctant to accept the idea of a board of inquiry with wide powers to investigate its industrial and personnel policies.
The strikers returned to work on 31 August on the understanding that further negotiations had been arranged for 14 September in Pon Moresby in which the company would produce a detailed proposal on housing and reclassification while the ternrination demand would be dealt with by a board of inquiry. The company initially requested a five day delay to the scheduled , meeting and then failed to produce its detailed proposals. When the company did produce its plan on 21 September it included an increase to 230 new houses plus a marginal low, ering of the eligibility classification. The union took the delays as an indication of lack of serious intent on the company's part and rejected the offer. It did accept the Department's suggestion that a board of inquiry be established but asked that it not only investigate the teuoination demand but also look at the entire operations of the company with particular attention to labour and employment , matters.
On 22 September unexpected industrial action bro~e out and vinually destroyed any chance of the parties arriving at a settlement through the conciliation process. In the early hours of that morning, a number of front ẽnd loaders and semi-trailers were used by the striking workers to close all roads and the airpon. Trenches we~e dug across the main roads into the town, barricades were erected and the main telecommunication cables were cut. Liquor outlets were broken into and the hotel building was vandalised. C~mpany vehicles were overturned while the golf and hash house harriers clubs, which were the preserves of the largely whire expatriate workforce were burnt down. Threats were made against the company's main office complex, commonly known as the "White House" and some expatriates complained of being physically harassed for having crossed the barricades (Niugini Nius, 23 Seprember 1988) .
The government's reaction was predictable. The frrst contingent of riot police arrived at Tabubil on 23 September and within three days there were 300 policemen and Defence Force soldiers in the town. A five member team of national politicians and senior bureaucrats arrived at Tabubil from Port Moresby on September 26 to investigate the situation. The team, headed by Father John Momis, Minister for Decentralisation, met with all the panies and soon after, endorsed the proposition that a board of inquiry be established immediately to investigate the dispute and submit its report to the National Executive Council. The company continued to reject the suggestion that the board investigate all aspects of its operations but no longer had any choice. A compulsory conference was convened on 30 September to endorse the option for a board of inquiry and fotmally request the Depa1unent of Labour and Employment ~o arrange for the board to be established. The strikers returned to work on 1 October and the union accepted the company's offer in respect to housing.
The three main issues facing the board of inquiry were the tetnaination demand, housing and training and localisation. The board wound up its fotrual hearings on 28 October and presented its report to the Minister on 18 November. The board's report contained 38 recommendations and also identified certain weaknesses within the company, the union, the Departments of Labour and Employment and Minerals and Energy. These organisations were dirẽct. ed by the board to implement relevant recommendations which pertain to their special areas of responsibility. In respect of the tern•ination demancL the board acknowledged the technical qualifications and expertise of Gazzard but concluded that "he has not been oriented to the proper and appropriate management sty lẽ and has an attitude intolerant to other's ideas" (Board of Inquiry, 1988, p.98) . On this basis. , the board recommended that in the event of any further industrial unrest resulting from his behaviour, BHP management should have him replaced. In the case of Konie, the board observẽd how he had been handicapped by "the ẽxpatriate dominated Personnel management'' and also how he had been "bypassed by
Operations management" which prevented him from perfot••ting his functions effectively. The board recommended that the Employee Relations Manager have the discretion of direct access to the General Manager over im 1 .,onant industrial relations matters. The board also recognised the need for adequa~e manpower and budgetary support for the ẽfficient operations of the Employee Rẽlations Depru unent. Furthexn1ore, the board recommended that both Gazzard and Konie fonnally apologise to the workers for their roles which partly precipitated the series of industrial actions.
The board merely endorsed the new Housing Agreement arrived at between the parties in October but emphasised the need to upgrade f:emale accommodation and recreational amenities and the introduction of a low cost home ownership scheme for employees below grade 6. While the board endorsed the October agreement on a 10 grade snucture, it identified the lack of progress and implementation of training and localisation programmes to have been a major impediment. The board recommended that no further work-peunits be granted to the company by the Department of Labour and Employment until a number of necessary adjustments were made within the company to ensure training and localisation programmes were implẽmented.
The dispute which had such a spectacular beginning and involved major State intervẽntion -including the deployment of riot police -was eff:ectively ẽnded by the almost mundane proceedings of the Board of Inquiry, . The issue this raises is: if the issues were resolvable by such an orderly means, why was it necessary for the dispute to take such a confrontationary and costly course to begin with? The simple answer offered by the General Secretary of the PNGTUC was that, "without that action the issues would never have been addressed" (lnteiView, Titimur). At the very least, the fact that PNG' s leading union official had such an attitude indicates that the industrial relations system is in some difficulty. If management and the industrial relations bureaucracy require the ẽrection of barricades, arson and looting to take place before they move on worker grievances there is good reason to believe that the nation's labour relations are in deep trouble.
The 1' 987 Air Niugini dispute By contrast the 1987 Air Niugini dispute was a dull affair. There were no strikes, no riotous behaviour and no police intervention. Nonetheless the course of the dispute reveals some of the same weaknesses in industrial relations as were evident at Ok Tedi. (Department of Labour, 1989) .
Under Air Niugini' s unitarist management approach any employee found to infringe management policies had to be terrninated so that in the long run only loyal and committed employees would remain. Once the workforce achieved some measure of industrial representation such .a policy was bound to lead to a rapid escalation in disputes. An example of the type of dispute this situation created may be seen in the 1987 case of Peter Simbago, demoted for negligence. It just happened that Simbago was the NEAE's president and there was no way that an inc1easingly organised union was going to accept that this · was not an act of victimisation. It took two years befm.e this case was settled at arbitration and during this lengthy delay the management tactic of reviewing decisions and not seeking a settlement gave the newly active unionists of the NAEA ample scope for developing a hostile attitude on the basis that they might be next.
The details of the case reveal that even in the public sector PNG management has a long way to go before it achieves a cooperative relationship with its workforce. In 1987, Peter Simbago was Passenger Handling Supervisor, a position he had held for over 18 months after nine years with Air Niugini. His duties included:
-controlling check-in counters -ensuring check-in traffic flows smoothly -ensuring all international transit passengers have proper visas -ensuring proper collection of excess baggage fees and l 52
Michael Hess and James Gissua -responsibility for two senior and 16 junior staff. He had been President of NAEA for about eight months and had been re-elected to serve for a second te1 rn. He was part of the movement which was revitalising the union and had brought McAlister into it's leadership to give it the industrial experience the rank and file officials lacked.
Simbago's demotion arose from his use of supervisory discretion in respect of a traffic officer., who had breached company practice in the use of concessional travel to return to his home province for a short period. The officer had arranged his leave coxrectly but had travelled on a non-approvẽd flight without a ticket. He had done this after previously arranging with Simbago, his supervisor, that he would in fact travel on an approved flight. Simbago was unaware that the officer had altered his plans. Under the circumstances, Simbago resorted to his discretionary powers, a privilege bestowed on supervisors which he had not used for sometime. He picked-up the officer's pay, paid for his return tickets and arranged for his ' travel back to Port Moresby. In view of his use of supervisor's discretion, he was content about his actions and considered it not necessary to report the traffic officer's infringement of policy.
Air Niugini suspended Simbago the day after the officer's return and demoted him from the position of Passenger Handling Supervisor Grade 7.2 to Traffic Officer Grade 3.5 a week later (ANG, 1987) . The decision by Air Niugini to have Simbago demoted had been the result of an investigation conducted by the Industrial Relations Department. The investigation report concluded that Simbago had condoned the officer's actions when he collected his pay, paid for his fares and airline tickets and failed to report the matter to the Airport M. anager. Howẽver, the union disputed the fmdings of the investigators on the basis that Sjmbago had never been provided an opportunity to submit his views.
It took ten months before the union notified the Depa.r unent of Labour and Employment of the existence of an industrial dispute. The delay was apparently due to the union's waiting for management to implement its own stated procedures. Official company policy was that demotions were to be reviewed every three to six months with reinstatements to fotmer positions based on perfounance. In this case, Air Niugini had not earned out such a review for 11 months and Simbago had al.Jieady recẽived excellent repons from his superiors in respect of a number of higher duties he had perfotmed in acting capacities.
In the circumstances management's unwillingness to reinstatẽ Simbago added to union suspicions about the motive for his demotion.
All conciliation attempts failed and on July 27, 1989 the Secretary of the Department of Labour and Employment recommended to the Minister the establishment of an arbitration tribunal for a decision on the dispute. The nibunal,s ' tenus of reference had been "to concern itself with the justification of the demotion of Simbago with a viẽw to have him reinstated or otherwise" (Depcuunent of Labour, 1989) . The union's submission rested on two major points. Firstly, in response to Air Niugini's argument about Simbago having condoned the officer's actions, the union argued that he had been unaware of the change of plan which gave rise to the infringements and that he had used his discretion to up-hold Air Niugini policy. Secondly, the union argued that Air Niugini had breached its own policy about reviews on demotion cases in failing to review Simbago's case after three and six months, particularly when all the repons about his perfonnances appeared to have been excellent Furthennore, Air Niugini had failed to provide any justification as to why the review had nevẽr taken place.
' The thrust of Air Niugini's submission was that Simbago had breached a number of policies. These breaches included his failure to report to his superiors, boarding of an Air Niugini mcraft without a ticket and ignorance of safety standards. Although Simbago had not been personally involved in the alleged breaches, these accusations were made on the basis that he had condoned the officer's actions in failing to report them. In respect of the failure to review Simbago' 's demotion, the company argued that it was giving Simbago reasonable time to pfove himself before a review was made.
In its assessment, the tribunal considered Air Niugini's submission to lack substance. Its decision was that Simbago was t, o be reinstated to his foiu1er position as Supervisor Passenger Handling and was to be compensated financially for the period of his demotion and any other monetary benefits that mi,ght be owing to him. Air Niugini responded with a formal objection claiming that the tribunal's detetuaination was "unfair, biased and completely wrong". The Deparnnent of Labour and Employment responded and advised Air Niugini to seek a judicial review at the National Court if it strongly felt that the tribunal's decision had been a serious miscarriage of justice. Air Niugini lodged with the National Court an appeal but this was later withdrawn soon after Simbago resigned.
As with the Ok Tedi dispute, the origin of the problem here lay in the lack of cooperative relations between the management and its workforce. That an employee of such standing would be treated as cavalierly as Simbago was is particularly incredible in view of the lack of experienced and skilled workers in the PNG labour market. Almost cenainJy management philosophy and Simbago's involvement in an increasingly militant union were the motives behind the particularly harsh action. As with the Ok Tedi dispute the ease with which the dispute was settled once the industrial relations machinery was set in motion points to the need for panies to have quicker access to the fouoal dispute settlement mechanisms.
Conclusion
This paper has looked at the development of PNG's industrial relations system and has provided brief details of a couple of examples of its recent operation. The purpose of this has been to highlight some of the difficulties facing the operation of the system. A major deficiency which emerges is the lack of attention to industrial relations in the management of enterprises. The disputes at Ok Tedi and Air Niugini simply should not have occurred and there is gcxxl reason to believe that they would not have occurred if industrial relations management in these ẽnterprises had been efficient. The solution seems to have three parts. The fll'St pan clearly lies in having systematically trained industrial relations officers. Even the best training, however, will not overcome a management philosophy which neglects industrial relations and prevents industrial relations management from doing its job properly. The second pan of the solution relates to unions and their operation. With a couple of exceptions PNG has not developed unions capable of representing their members' interests. If the Ok Tedi General Workers' Union had done its job efficiently the operators would not have needed to take wildcat action to draw attention to their grievances. The final pan of the solution is to give disputants easy and rapid access to the industrial dispute settlement mechanisms.
None of these solutions are without cost In particular the fotrual dispute machinery suffers greatly from under staffing and under resourcing. In the long run, however, the cost of unnecessary industrial disputes is likely to be much greater.
